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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Appellant Boyd A,, Ward, a dismissed 
marshal of Richfield City, •> u -la^ s ^'y, f,,r qenerai 
- -\ r nay ^nd 
o e n e f i t a , a t t o r n e y ^ t e e s , an,:' other :^lief« 
""h \ s • <-•* -»P A<i *- r i t- •* R + t^ * *r * 1$ «.^ -^  -i v «* . , +• 1 9b 1 w v * 
*
 i
 • . , . i : c i , 1 ' ^ c i . r d , p a c e s r ,i . 
f ion , t h e :*. i -orar>le To T i b b s , S i x t h ^ i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d c .
 # and 
^"iTpd a ^ p ^ ^ f 1 ' ^ ^ o i r p l c i r t (p c r - i r. *~i - - * 
.i-^o!*w .:.._; *,. : . r i n y , a n ! .s iDd ibJd l *.: _hi*~f 
: - l i c e : . - i c h f i e l d C i t y , M l oi i » . c i f i « I ^ i t K i r h f i e l d 
— P s e r v e d w i t h - ^ r - • . 
. v . h v ^ irit-t*' . x - s c h e d u l e d t o r J u n e
 f
 sr h e r e a f t e r 
h e a r i n g f o r d i r e l i m i n a r y i n i i - n r t i o n Wri? v
 e * ^ K^-F r e + he 
- * - a i . *, 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t iuj .ec: r n a r p u r s u a n t *o . , \ > " 9 : , S e c t i o n 
1 C - 3 - 9 1 1 i*- ' -:'* Ti< i r i s d i c + - 4 •• f ^ n t e r f e i e w i t h th> J * £ 
PRIOR D I S I
 t ; oN_ IN THE UTAH SUPREME CPUS! 
T h e r e a f t e r , Ward a p r n p 1 . ^ *~u • J t 
I ; • ii< w^i . , Jiiii^LjLj. 1 ^ r>h11e 1 d C11 ^ , <* r * 'o 265 
( U t a r 1yg« "! i s Court r u l e d t h a t V.c.;^, ! 9 5 3 , S e c t i o n 
1 0 , "^  a 1 i 4 - . * ^ ,. *. ~ ^ , 
,< r t ' i . r e , t ^ e ^ xi>ta i , t v. J U I t <;iw Dave ; u r i s c n c t i c i u The 
c a s e was r e m a n d e d f* " h e P i s t i ; c t C o u r t . L ^ r i l ; t , . - , w v # a.wx 
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
On July 30, 1986, the District Court heard Ward's Motion for 
Change of Venue, Motion to Amend the Complaint, Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, and Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court also heard Richfield's Motion for Summary Judgment* The 
Court denied Ward's Motion for Change of Venue, granted Ward's 
Motion to Amend the Complaint, denied Ward's Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, and terminated the original Temporary 
Restraining Order retroactively to June 17, 1981, (Record, pages 
391 and 392). The District Court took under advisement the two 
Motions for Summary Judgment and subsequently denied Ward's 
Motion and granted Richfield's Motion (Record, pages 386 to 
388). Ward appealed the decision of the District Court to the 
Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District 
Court and entered the decision on June 14, 1989. On July 10, 
1989, the Court of Appeals denied the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing. Appellant hereby requests that this Court reverse 
those decisions on the basis of manifest error and enter 
judgment in favor of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
When Ward was marshal of Richfield City, Richfield caused an 
agenda to be prepared and distributed which listed the 
anticipated activities for the Richfield City Council meeting on 
April 2, 1981; however, the agenda did not contain the 
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information that Richfield was going to consider terminating 
Ward as marshal. Richfield went into a closed meeting and all 
members of the public who were in attendance at the open meeting 
were excluded from the closed meeting. Kent Colby, an 
individual who was excluded from the closed meeting, requested 
that Richfield contact him in the event the closed meeting ended 
so that he could be present if Richfield took any further action 
affecting the community. In the closed meeting Richfield 
discussed terminating Ward as marshal. Richfield did not advise 
the public that it was going back into open meeting. Richfield 
entered the termination of Ward in the minutes of the Council 
meeting after the closed meeting was concluded. Ward was 
terminated as marshal or chief of police, effective on April 3, 
1981. On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted to Richfield a written 
request for a hearing to appeal his termination. Richfield did 
not give Ward a hearing to appeal his termination. 
On June 2, 1981, Ward advised Richfield he intended to take 
legal action to challenge his termination. On Friday, June 5, 
1981, Richfield caused notice to be given to the local 
newspaper, The Richfield Reaper, and the local radio station, 
KSVC, that a non-scheduled City Council meeting was to be held 
on Monday, June 8, 1981, at 8:00 a.m. On June 8, 1989, prior to 
the City Council meeting, all officials of Richfield were served 
with a Temporary Restraining Order by which Richfield was 
"ORDERED that the defendants, and each of them, be and they are 
hereby temporarily restrained and enjoined from taking any 
further action against plaintiff by way of terminating 
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plaintiff's services as chief of police of Richfield City," 
Richfield, after being served the Temporary Restraining Order, 
took action against Ward to terminate him as Chief of police of 
Richfield City by attempting to ratify the previous action taken 
by Richfield in the closed meeting on April 2, 1981. 
In the initial hearing before the trial court on June 17, 
1981, the parties stipulated to specific facts. Those 
stipulated facts are set forth below and reference is made to 
the pages of the record where the stipulations are found: 
1. The agenda for the April 1, 1981, City Council meeting 
did not state that Richfield would consider the termination of 
Ward as Chief of Police (Record, page 47). 
2. During the Council meeting, Richfield went into a 
closed meeting (Record, page 47). 
3. At the time that Richfield went into closed meeting, 
the members of the public that were in attendance at the open 
meeting were excluded from the closed meeting (Record, page 47). 
4. Kent Colby, the representative of KSVC Radio Station 
who was a member of the public present at the Council meeting 
when Richfield went into the closed meeting, requested that he 
be contacted so that he could be present if Richfield went back 
into open meeting to transact any further business (Record, 
pages 48 and 49). 
5. Richfield did not communicate to Colby that it was 
going back into open meeting to transact further public business 
so that Colby could be present (Record, pages 48 and 49). 
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6. Ward was terminated as chief of police at the April 2, 
1981, meeting by Richfield effective April 3, 1981 (Record, page 
50). 
7. Termination of Ward as chief of police was entered on 
the minutes of the council meeting after the closed meeting ws 
concluded (Record, page 50). 
8. On Tuesday, June 2, 1981, Richfield through its 
attorney, was advised that Ward intended to take action pursuant 
to the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act (Record, page 51). 
9. On Friday, June 5, 1981, at approximately 5:30 p.m., 
notice of a special Richfield City Council meeting to be held on 
Monday, June 8, 1981, at 8:00 a.m. was given to the local 
newspaper, Richfield Reaper, and the local radio station, KSVC 
(Record, page 51). 
10. On Monday, June 8, 1981, Richfield was served a 
Temporary Restraining Order providing as follows: 
It is ordered that the defendants and each of them be and 
they are hereby temporarily restrained and enjoined from 
taking any further action against plaintiff by way of 
terminating plaintiff's services as Chief of Police of 
Richfield City. (Record, pages 51 and 52.) 
11. Richfield, after having been served the Temporary 
Restraining Order, violated the Temporary Restraining Order and 
took action against Ward to terminate him as chief of police 
(Record page 52). 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The District Court allowed Ward to file an amended complaint 
(Record, pages 360 to 375, 391 and 392). The amended complaint 
set forth an alternative cause of action that if Ward 
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was legally fired that he was entitled to a hearing to appeal 
the firing. Since the trial court granted Richfieldfs Motion 
for Summary Judgment, all of the facts alleged by Ward must be 
viewed in a light favorable to Ward. The pertinent facts 
alleged by Ward are set forth below: 
12. On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted to Richfield a written 
request for a hearing pursuant to Sections 10-3-1105 and 
10-3-1106 to appeal his termination as Chief of Police (Record, 
pages 293 to 300 and page 373, Exhibit nB,f). 
13. Ward did not receive a hearing in response to his 
written request to appeal his termination (Record, pages 293 to 
299). 
14. Richfield enacted the Richfield City Police Department 
Policies and Procedures Manual which was in effect on April 2, 
1981 (Record, pages 328 to 331, Exhibit lfD"). 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ISSUED A DECISION IN CONFLICT WITH 
DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE 
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY IGNORING 
THE STIPULATED FACTS AND FACTS SET FORTH BY APPELLANT AND 
RELYING UPON THE FACTS OF THE RESPONDENTS IN AFFIRMING THE 
TRIAL COURTfS SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT 
When a judgment is entered pursuant to a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Court of Appeals, or any appellate court, must 
analyze the judgment in a light favorable to the facts of the 
Appellant and, basically, accept the facts of the Appellant as 
being true; however, the Court of Appeals in its opinion has 
relied upon and cited several facts set forth by the Respondents 
and contested by the Appellant. Moreover, the facts 
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relied upon by the Court of Appeals are contradicted by the 
stipulated facts, which stipulated facts are binding upon both 
the parties and the Court. 
On page two of the decision of the Court of Appeals (the 
decision is set forth in the appendix), the Court specifically 
stated, "The Council was concerned about several recent 
resignations within the Police Department." The Appellant 
specifically disputed the allegation that there had been recent 
resignations. There had been resignations or termination of six 
officers over a period of six years. Some of those resignations 
had taken place prior to Ward becoming Chief of Police. 
Moreover, in the record is the Affidavit of John Bettfruend 
disputing the allegations. Bettfruend was the acting Chief of 
Police after Ward was dismissed and had previously been a police 
officer in Richfield. Bettfruend stated that he was not aware 
of any threats of officers who intended to resign. 
Of particular importance is the first footnote on page 3 of 
the Court of Appeals1 decision. The footnote reads as follows: 
1. Prior to the closed session, the Council asked whether 
anyone present wanted to be notified if open session 
resumed. Most of those present were members of the media 
and they responded that they did not necessarily desire to 
return, but wanted to be advised if action were taken. 
In order to cite the above facts of the Respondents, the Court 
of Appeals had to disregard the stipulated facts. Stipulated 
facts are binding not only upon the parties but also upon the 
Court. The stipulated facts are as follows: 
4. Kent Colby, the respresentative of KSVC Radio Station, 
who was a member of the public present when Richfield went 
into the closed meeting, requested that he be contacted so 
that he could be present if Richfield went back into open 
meeting to transact any further business (record, pp. 
48-49). 
5. Richfield did not communicate to Colby that it was 
going back into open meeting to transact further public 
business so that Colby could be present (record, pp. 48-49). 
These stipulated facts are extremely significant. U.C.A., 
Section 52-4-4 of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act in part 
specifically states, "...provided, no ordinance, resolution, 
rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall be approved at 
a closed meeting..." Therefore, if one member of the public 
specifically requested to be present when the Council went back 
into open session and the Council did not communicate that it 
was going back into open session, the Council was still in a 
closed meeting because the public could not be present. 
Therefore, the City Council was specifically prohibited by law 
from passing any resolution. Ahnert v. Sunnyside Unified School 
Dist. No. 12, 126 Ariz. 473, 616 P.2d 933 (Ariz. App. 1980). 
The minutes of the City Council meetings in the record in 
this case show that all of the Council's decisions were done in 
the form of a resolution. A resolution is specifically 
prohibited by the statute from being enacted in a closed 
meeting. Therefore, if the City Council was in a closed 
meeting, any resolution was in violation of the Utah Open and 
Public Meetings Act (U.C.A., 1953, Section 52-4-1, et. seq.). 
In support of Ward's position and in opposition to the 
Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment was an Affidavit of 
Boyd Adams, a former chief of police in American Fork City. The 
Affidavit clearly indicated that the agenda of the American Fork 
City Council stated that it was going to consider terminating 
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Adams as chief of police. In response to the notice of the 
agenda, the public rallied behind Adams and caused the City 
Council to keep him on as the chief of police* This is a very 
significant fact opposing the Respondents1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, When the people know what a public body is going to 
do, they can significantly influence the public body. The 
Afidavit of Adams is completely on point with this case. In its 
analysis the Court of Appeals should have made the assumption 
that the citizens of Richfield could have rallied behind 
Appellant as the public rallied behind Adams. Subsequent to his 
termination, Ward was elected to the office of Constable, 
demonstrating his popularity with the citizens. 
It is very interesting to note that at page 3 in the 
decision of the Court of Appeals that it specifically found 
that, "The Council concluded the closed meeting with a unanimous 
vote# one member abstaining, to discharge Ward. Minutes of the 
closed meeting were recorded and when the Council resumed open 
session a formal vote to discharge Ward was taken." [Emphasis 
added.] Thus, the Court of Appeals found that a decision to 
terminate Appellant was made in the closed meeting. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that an appellate 
court must review the facts of the party against whom Summary 
Judgment has been granted in a manner most favorable to him. 
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289 259 P.2d 297 (1953); 
Young v. Texas Co., 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958); Brandt 
v. Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960); 
Bridge v. Backmanf 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909 (1960); 
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Allen's Prods, Co, v. Glover, 18 Utah 2d 9, 414 P.2d 93 (1966); 
Geneva Pipe Co, v, S & H Ins, Co,f 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986), 
The Court of Appeals has not analyzed this case in a light 
favorable to the facts of the Appellant. In view of the 
Appellant's facts and the stipulated facts, it is obvious that 
the City did not publish an agenda and give notice that Ward 
would be fired. Futhermore, it is obvious that the City Council 
actually made the decision in a closed meeting. Both actions 
violate of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. Moreover, the 
Affidivit of Adams establishes what can happen when public 
notice is given. Thus, on the basis of the facts asserted by 
Appellant and the stipulated facts, this Court should reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN WARD 
V. RICHFIELD CITYy 716 P.2d 265 (UTAH 1984), CALL V. WEST 
JORDAN, 727 P.2d 180 (UTAH 1986), AND COMMON CAUSE OF UTAH V. 
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 598 P.2d 1312 (UTAH 1979). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 
265 (Utah 1984), held that the legislature has made a 
distinction between cities of the first and second class and 
cities of the third class. It further pointed out that the 
entire municipal code was rewritten in 1977. In light of these 
concepts, two separate sets of statutes must be analyzed. The 
first set of statutes is Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106. 
Section 10-3-1105 states as follows: 
All appointive officers and employees of the 
municipalities, other than members of the police 
departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and 
superintendents, shall hold their employments without 
limitation of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal 
only as hereinafter provided. 
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The Court of Appeals stated that it is necessary to review 
individual statutes in terms of the entire body of statutes. 
The language which is troublesome in Section 10-3-1105 is, 
"..•members of the police departments, fire departments, heads 
of departments..." The second set of statutes is Sections 
10-3-1001 through 1013. These pertain to cities of the first 
and second class and clarify the troublesome language. These 
statutes require cities of the first and second class to 
maintain a Civil Service Commission, which controls the appeals 
of "members of the police departments" of cities of those 
cities. Furthermore, Section 10-3-909 states, 
The Board of City Commissioners or other governing body of 
each city of the first or the second class shall create, 
support, maintain and control a police department and may 
create, support, maintain and control a fire department in 
their respective cities. [Emphasis added.] 
Section 10-3-916, at the time this case arose, provided that 
each city of the third class would appoint a marshal. 
It is clear from a review of the statutes, that municipal 
employees in general, can appeal their firing pursuant to 
Section 10-3-1105, and that members of the police departments 
and fire departments can appeal their firing pursuant to 
Sections 10-3-1001 through 1012. This Court stated in the Ward 
Case, supra, at page 266, 
Conspicuously absent from this statute is the 
provision contained in Section 10-3-911 making the removal 
of the chief of police free from all judicial oversight. 
"It probably is not wholly inaccurate to suppose that 
ordinarily when people say one thing they do not mean 
something else." 2AC. Sands, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction, Section 47-01, as sighted in Hansen v. 
Wilkinson, Utah, 658 P.2d 1216 (1983). We construe a 
statute on the assumption that each term is used advisedly 
and that the intent of the legislature is revealed in the 
use of the term in the context and structure in which it is 
placed. [Emphasis added.] 
Sections 10-3-916, 10-3-918, 10-3-919 authorized third class 
cities to have a marshal and assistants• The legislature never 
authorized a third class city to have a "police department". As 
the Supreme Court noted, "It probably is not wholly inaccurate 
to suppose that ordinarily when people say one thing they do not 
mean something else." This Court is referred to Sections 
10-3-924 through 926 which set forth the appointment, term of 
office and duties of a city manager. These sections were also 
enacted in 1977. The legislature specifically states that a 
city manager may be terminated at will by the governing body. 
It can be concluded that if the legislature intended to prevent 
marshals of cities of the third class from appealing 
termination, it would have stated so as it did with city 
managers. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, marshals of a third class city do have a statutory 
right of appeal pursuant to Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106. 
In Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance of West Jordan City, 
which ordinance had been enacted in violation of statutory 
requirements. Therefore, to be consistent with that decision, 
this Court should void the actions of Richfield which are in 
violation of statute and reverse the Summary Judgment against 
the Appellant. 
This Court specifically held in Common Cause of Utah v. Utah 
Public Service Commission, 598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979), that, 
although the Public Service Commission may have quasi-judicial 
discussions and determinations in a closed meeting, no final 
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decisions can be made in a closed meeting but must be made in an 
open meeting. Thus, the Court of Appeals has allowed Richfield 
to violate the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act by not voiding 
the actions of Richfield in firing Ward on April 2, 1981. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated at page 4, "Even 
if technical violations had occurred in the April meeting, they 
were subsequently cured." The Court seems to suggest that if a 
law is violated it can be cured at a later date. This is not 
correct. If a law is violated, it is violated. If a public 
body is going to "cure" a violation at a later date, the only 
way it can do so is by accomplishing the action in accordance 
with the statutory requirements. There are criminals and others 
who would like to "cure" an original violation of a statute. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
III. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SUBSITUTED ITS OWN 
DISCRETION FOR SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH BY ALLOWING RESPONDENTS 
TO VIOLATE THE UTAH OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT 
The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in their respective 
opinions have raised the question, "What is in the public 
interest?" The legislature in U.C.A., Section 52-4-1, answers 
that question as follows: 
In enacting this chapter the legislature finds and 
declares that the State, its agencies and political 
subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the people's 
business. It is the intent of the law that the action of 
public bodies be taken openly and that the deliberations be 
conducted openly. 
It is an abuse of discretion for both the trial court and 
the Court of Appeals to subsitute their perceptions of what is 
best for the public instead of upholding the written intent of 
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the legislature that the people's business must be deliberated 
and conducted openly. Thus, Ward respectfully argues that it is 
in the public interest for Richfield to comply strictly and 
completely with statutes and orders of the courts. It is not 
in the best interest of the people for any public body to 
violate statutes and court orders. 
IV. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SPECIFICALLY 
RULED THAT APPELLANT WAS A MEMBER OF THE RICHFIELD CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, BUT HAS INCORRECTLY DENIED HIM THE 
RIGHTS OF APPEAL EXTENDED TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT BY THE "RICHFIELD CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURE MANUAL" 
The Court of Appeals in footnote 4 at page 6 of the decision 
summarily stated that the "Richfield City Police Department 
Policy and Procedures Manual" does not pertain to the chief of 
police. Subparagraph W of the Manual states, "Dismissals are 
subject to appeal to the Richfield Appeals Board. Procedures 
for such appeals are outlined in the Richfield City Personnel 
Policies and Procedures Manual." [Emphasis added.] The 
Appellant was an employee of Richfield City. Certainly as a 
member of the department, as so held by the Court of Apeals, he 
was entitled to an appeal. Thus, any employee of Richfield City 
who is fired has the right to appeal to the Richfield City 
Appeals Board pursuant to procedures enacted by Richfield. This 
Court of Appeals was in error in using a footnote to strip Ward 
of the benefits of that policy enacted by the Richfield City 
Council. Therefore, Ward should be entitled to the appeal 
process created by Richfield City. 
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS UPHELD THE INCONSISTENT DECISION 
OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER WHICH WAS VIOLATED BY THE RESPONDENTS 
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In the Order Granting Summary Judgment, dated September 29, 
1986# the Trial Court provided that it would not be in the 
public interest to disturb the actions of Richfield on April 2, 
and June 8, 1981. However, in its Order dated October 22, 1986, 
subsequent to the Order granting Summary Judgment, the Court 
stated as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied, and it is 
specifically ordered that the Temporary Restraining Order 
terminated on June 17, 1981, the date of the first hearing 
before this Court. 
The parties stipulated that: 
11. Richfield, after having been served the Temporary 
Restraining Order, violated the Temporary Restraining Order 
and took action against Ward to terminate him as chief of 
police (Record, page 52). 
The Trial Court specifically terminated the restraining order on 
June 17, 1981. Thus, the Respondents violated the Temporary 
Restraining Order of the Court on June 8, 1981. The Appellant 
is entitled to rely upon the last Order of the Court making the 
Temporary Restraining Order binding upon the Respondents until 
June 17, 1981. The Supreme Court should uphold the judicial 
authority of the courts to issue a Temporary Restraining Order 
upon a public body and the need for the public body to comply 
with the Order. 
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT, SPECIFIC 
QUESTION OF MUNICIPAL LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, 
BUT SHOULD BE, DECIDED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
The issue of what a public body may do and may not do in 
relationship to the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act is 
important. Pursuant to U.C.A., Section 78-2-2, the Supreme 
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Court is given original jurisdiction over such appeals. The 
Supreme Court referred this matter to the Court of Appeals. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has made a decision which is 
not consistent with the previous decisions of this Court. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeal has undermined the need for public 
bodies to comply with statutes and Court orders. Therefore, 
this Court should consider these matters and render a decision. 
Respondents prepared an agenda for the April 2, 1981, City 
Council meeting; however, Respondents did not list on the agenda 
that they would consider terminating Appellant as marshal. The 
failure to give public notice was in violation of U.C.A., 1953, 
Section 52-4-6. Furthermore, Richfield excluded all members of 
the public from the City Council meeting when it went into a 
closed meeting. During the closed meeting, Respondents decided 
to fire Ward as marshal. U.C.A, 1953, Section 52-4-3 
specifically prohibits public bodies from taking actions in 
closed meetings. The Appellant and the Respondents stipulated 
in open court that a member of the public had requested to be 
present when the City Council went back into open meeting; 
however, the City Council did not advise that person as he had 
requested. Thus, it was impossible for any member of the public 
to be present at the meeting. Therefore, the acts of Richfield 
should be declared null and void and the decision of the Court 
of Appeals should be reversed. 
The Utah legislature has provided that municipal employees 
may appeal their termination from employment. The legislature 
has also required first and second class cities to maintain 
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police "departments" but has enacted specific statutes for the 
members of those "departments" to appeal their termination. On 
the other hand, the legislature has only required third class 
cities to appoint a marshal and has given third class cities the 
discretion to appoint assistants to the marshal. The marshal 
and assistants are not members of a police "department" and, 
therefore, have rights of appeal as specified for all other 
municipal employees. In the case of Worrall v. Ogden City Fire 
Department, 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980), this Court ruled that a 
person discharged from a department must be informed of his 
right to a hearing. Thus, this Court has reinforced the rights 
of appeal. Consequently, if Ward was legally fired, he had the 
right to appeal his discharge and the lower Courts erred in not 
granting him the right to that appeal. Moreover, Ward should be 
entitled to an appeal hearing pursuant to the provisions of the 
"Richfield City Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual". 
These are extremely important legal issues. Whenever a 
public body violates specific prohibitions placed upon it by the 
legislature; whenever a public body publically disregards a 
restraining order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
and whenever an individual is unable to appeal termination of 
employment when procedures are established both by the State 
legislature and by the municipality for which the person is 
employed; there are grave injustices and abuses of power. 
Therefore, these matters should be addressed by the Supreme 
Court, and the decision of the Court of Appeals should be 
reversed. 
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Appellant prays that this Court will void the actions of 
Richfield, reinstate him, and award him back pay, employment 
benefits, attorney fees, general damages, punitive damages, and 
any other relief this Court deems appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ?? day of August, 1989. 
The attorney for Appellant Boyd A. Ward respectfully hereby 
certifies that this Writ of Certiorari is made in good faith 
without any intent to delay the proceedings herein. 
GeorgerE. Brown, Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
Appellant's Writ of Certiorari of Appellant were mailed, postage 
prepaid, this ^ day of August, 1989, to the following: 
Ken Chamberlain 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
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DISTRICT COURT ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A 
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 m0ll, 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD A. WARD, 
P U i n C l f f
- O R D E R 
- v s -
Civil No. 8626 
RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal 
Corporacion, ec alf 
Defendanc. 
The Plaintiff and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgments 
on stipulated facts came before the Court on July 30, 1986. 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied. The Defendant1s 
Objection to Bill of Costs is Denied, except for che amounc of che 
cash bond which has been returned by Court Order Co Plaintiff. 
The Court finds that in accordance wich 10-6-32 UCA, the law in 
effect at the time of this case, the cerm of the Chief of Police of a 
Third Class City shall be until the municipal election next following 
his appoinCmenC, unless sooner removed by Che Mayor wich che concurrence 
of a majoricy of members of Che Cicy Council, or by che Cicy Council wich 
Che concurrence of che mayor. 
The Court finds that Richfield City called a public meeting; 
Chac che agenda delivered to the news media did noc have on ic any 
information concerning the termination of the Police Chief; chac che 
Cicy Council went into executive session during che public reccing 
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and later reconvened to announce the Police Chief termination. 
Section 52-4-3 UCA provides that meetings should be open to 
the public. Section 52-4-8 provides that any final action taken in vio-
lation of Section 52-4-3 and Section 52-4-6 is voidable by a Court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
The absence of an item of business on the Agenda does not preclude 
its consideration. The "sunshine law" 52-4-1 UCA etc., provides that 
meetings are open to the public. The agenda is to be delivered to the 
news media. The penalty for violation is voidable by a Court of competent 
jurisdiction. Tie act does not establish any right to be heard or to 
participate in debate, or to be represented by witnesses or legal council. 
The purpose of the act is informational in its objective and does not 
provide a procedural process for persons affected by legislative acts 
of the Council except as above stated. 
The Court finds that it would not be in the public interest to 
void the action taken by the Richfield City Council on April 2, 1981, and 
as ratified by it in a June 8, 1981 meeting. 
The only issue the Plaintiff in this case could litigate is whether 
or not the Mayor and Counsel voted to terminate him, and the affidavits 
filed in this case conclusively stated they did and they thereby dispose 
of that issue. 
The Court finds that the dismissal was not malicious or in wanton 
disregard of Plaintiff's rights. 
-3-
CIVIL NO. 8626 
Ward -vs- Richfield City 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of the above and foregoing Order to the following, 
postage prepaid from offices at Manti, Utah, thi * 2 ? day of Sep tember, 
1986: 
Ken Chamberlain, Attorney at Law 
76 South Main 
Richfield, Utah, 84701 
George E. Brown, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
7001 South 900 East Suite 340 
Midvale. Utah. 84047 
7?m£l^ 
Carole 
Trial Court Executive 
Manti, Utah, 84642 
DISTRICT COURT ORDER PERTAINING TO 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
CtORGE E. BROWN,
 JH. jA3GltI| . 7 ^ -
Attorney
 f o r pi a i n t i f f 
7001 South 900 East, S u i t elSfrl BCI 27 PH 12- «4 2 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801) 562-55S5:;Y 
I" THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU RT IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
QOYD A. WARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHFIELD CITY, 
a municipal corporation, et al. 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 8626 
The Plaintiff 
and his attorney, George E. Brown, Jr., and 
the attorney for defendants, Ken Chamberla.n, appeared before 
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs on the 30th day of July, 1986. The 
Court, having reviewed the plaintiffs Motion for Change of 
Venue, the plaintiff's Motion for Prelir 
the plaintiff 
made, 
.mi nary Injunction, and 
s Motion to Ainend Complaint, arguments havin g been 
Change IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion for 
of Venue is denied. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the p.aintiff 's .Motion to A^end 
the Complaint is granted subject to the defendant's right to 
provide further opposing argument in the event that the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. since the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment addresses the new cause 
of action contained in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the 
granting of the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will 
result in judgment against the plaintiff on all causes of action 
contained in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction is denied, and it is specifically ordered 
that the Temporary Restraining Order terminated on June 17, 
1981, the date of the first hearing before this Court. 
DATED this 2^ 2-day of OCK t)ltM , 1986. 
-R¥—THE COURT: 
I hereby certify that I ma-iled a true and cornect copy of 
the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, on this
 t<^ytJ{day of 
October, 1986, to the following individual: 
Ken Chamberlain 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, UT 84701 
tjTUUs^ 
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COVER SHEET 
CASE TITLE: 
Boyd A. Ward, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
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ooOoo — 
Boyd A. Ward, 
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v. 
Richfield City, a municipal 
corporation, et al.# 
Defendants and Respondents* 
Sixth District, Sevier County 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880713-CA 
F I L E D 
%m$m*— 
^ W y T Nco.ian 
Clark of *\* Court 
Utoh Court of Appeals 
Attorneys: George E. Brown, Jr., Midvale, for Appellant 
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Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Garff. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
This appeal concerns whether 
properly dismissed as Richfield C 
claimed below that the Utah Open 
violated, that the Richfield City 
temporary restraining order by ta 
action to dismiss him 
for an administrative 
court granted summary 
affirm. 
as Chief of 
appeal was 
judgment in 
appellant, Boyd Ward, was 
ity Chief of Police. Ward 
and Public Meetings Act was 
Council disregarded a 
king further subsequent 
Police, and that his request 
improperly denied. The trial 
favor of Richfield City. We 
FACTS 
On April 2, 1981, the Richfield City Council held a public 
meeting after publishing an agenda as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 52-4-6 (1981). The agenda did not list Ward's 
discharge as Chief of Police. Following discussion of items 
on the agenda, the Council voted to hold a closed meeting and 
invited Ward to join them in discussing his position as Chief 
of Police. The Council was concerned about several recent 
resignations within the police department. Discussion of 
Ward's termination ensued and the Council decided to terminate 
Ward. The Council resumed open session and formally voted to 
discharge Ward effective April 3, 1981. 
On April 6, 1981/ Ward submitted a written request to the 
Council for an administrative appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 10-3-1105 and -1106 (1981). The request was denied. On 
June 5# 1981, the Council published notice that a special 
meeting would be held on June 8, 1981, to ratify its actions 
taken at the April meeting. The Council published an agenda 
that included Ward's discharge as an item for discussion. 
Prior to the meeting, Ward served the Council with a temporary 
restraining order, to restrain it from taking any further 
action against him. Despite the~temporary restraining order, 
the Council ratified its decision to terminate Ward. 
On June 17, 1981, the trial court held a preliminary 
injunction hearing and determined that pursuant to the removal 
statute for chiefs of police, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-911 
(repealed 1987), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
Section 10-3-911 stated in part that "[t]he chief of police or 
fire department of the cities may at any time be removed, 
without a trial, hearing or opportunity to be heard, by the 
board of commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of the 
service will be served thereby." 
Ward appealed the trial court's decision to the Utah 
Supreme Court and the court decided in Ward v. Richfield City, 
716 P.2d 265 (Utah 1984), that the trial court did have 
jurisdiction because section 10-3-911 did not pertain to third 
class cities. The case was remanded to the trial court. On 
remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Richfield City. The court ruled that although the agenda for 
the April 2, 1981 meeting did not include the termination of 
Ward as Chief of Police, nevertheless, it was not in the public 
interest to void the Council's action at either the April 2 or 
the June 8 meeting. 
Ward contends on appeal that: (1) the Council violated the 
Utah Open and Public. Meetings Act in the April 2, 1981 meeting; 
(2) the Council, on June 8, 1981, acted in violation of the 
temporary restraining order; (3) the Council wrongfully denied 
him the right to appeal his discharge; (4) the trial court 
erroneously applied the law in granting summary judgment in 
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favor of Richfield City; and (5) he is entitled to 
reinstatement, back pay and damages. 
UTAH OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT 
We first examine whether the Council violated the Utah Open 
and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981), 
at the. April 2, 1981 meeting and if so, whether the June 8 
meeting cured any such violation. The purpose of the Utah Open 
and Public Meetings Act is to ensure that the actions of the 
state, its agencies, and political subdivisions are conducted 
openly, fiefi Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Serv. Comm'n, 
598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979). Political subdivisions, as defined 
in Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-201 (1981), include municipal 
corporations and municipalities. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-601 
(1981) provides that all meetings of the governing body of each 
municipality shall be held in compliance with the provisions of 
the open and public meetings law. 
Ward contends that Richfield City failed to comply with the 
agenda and notice provisions of the open meetings law and that 
such failure should void the action taken at the April 
meeting. Ward argues that the subject of his discharge should 
have been listed on the agenda, even if discussions regarding 
him were conducted in a closed meeting. This contention fails 
for two reasons. First, the open meetings act designates 
certain subjects which are exempt from discussion in open 
meetings. See section 52-4-5. Where at least two-thirds of 
the public body present at an open meeting vote to hold a 
closed meeting to discuss the character, professional 
competence, or physical or mental health of an individual, then 
a closed meeting may be held. See section 52-4-4. The Council 
voted in the April open meeting to sequester themselves to 
discuss Ward's professional competence in compliance with 
section 52-4-4. The Council concluded the closed meeting with 
a unanimous vote, one member abstaining, to discharge Ward. 
Minutes of the closed meeting were recorded and when the 
Council resumed open session, a formal vote to discharge Ward 
was taken.1 
1. Prior to the closed session, the Council asked whether 
anyone present wanted to be notified if open session resumed. 
Most of those present were members of the media and they 
responded that they did not necessarily desire to return, but 
wanted to be advised if action were taken. 
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Second, even if technical violations had occurred in the 
April meeting, they were subsequently cured. On June 5, notice 
of the special session scheduled for June 8 was provided to the 
local newspaper and the radio station in compliance with the 
agenda and notice provisions of section 52-4-6(3). The agenda 
for theJune 8 meeting included Ward's discharge and the media 
was notified more than twenty-four hours in advance. At the 
June meeting, the Council voted without opposition to ratify 
its actions taken at the April meeting. Ward argues that the 
action taken at the June meeting violated the temporary 
restraining order.2 The order restrained the Council from 
taking any further action against him. Richfield City argues 
that the June meeting merely ratified action that had already 
been taken and, therefore, was not new action. 
In a proceeding for violation of an injunction, it is 
generally neia tnat tne extent ot tne pumsnment rests in tne 
sound discretion of the court. See Henslev v. Board of 
Education, 210 Kan. 858, 504 P.2d 184, 189 (1972); People v. 
Mulqrew, 19 111. App. 3d 327, 311 N.E.2d 378, 383 (1974). "The 
inherent power of a court rendering a permanent injunction to 
enforce its decree and to modify or revoke the injunction for 
equitable reasons due to changed conditions is generally 
recognized . . . ." Mulqrew, 311 N.E.2d at 382. The trial 
court held that it was not in the public's best interest to 
void the action taken by the Council in terminating Ward. We 
will not disturb judgments in injunction proceedings that rest 
within the sound discretion of the trier of facts, unless an 
abuse of discretion clearly appears from the record. See 
Hensley. 504 P.2d at 188. 
RIGHT TO APPEAL DISCHARGE 
The Mayor, with the advice and consent of the Council, 
appointed Ward to the position of Richfield City Chief of 
Police, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-916 (1981). This 
same body had the authority to dismiss Ward, without a hearing, 
notice, or cause. In Hutchison v. Cartwriaht, 692 P.2d 772, 
773-774 (Utah 1984), the court held that unless otherwise 
controlled by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is 
2. Ward asserts that he would have mobilized supporters had he 
known the Council planned on taking action despite the 
temporary restraining order. However, the council was under no 
duty to notify Ward personally of its intended action. 
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appurtenant to the power to appoint. -When an individual is 
appointed by an official, •the office is held during the 
pleasure of the authority making the appointment, and . . . no 
notice or charges or hearings are required for the suspension 
or removal by the authority appointing the officer.•" I&. at 
774 (quoting Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of Comm'rs, 
71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783, 784 (1928)). "The rule of common law 
was that the appointment to municipal office carried with it no 
vested property interest in continued employment, and such 
officers were subject to removal without cause, reason or 
hearing unless otherwise prescribed.- Carlson v. Bratton, 681 
P.2d 1333, 1337 (Wyo. 1984). Since the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that section 10-3-911 did not apply, there is not an 
applicable statute explicitly governing the dismissal of chiefs 
of police or city marshals in third class cities.3 
Therefore, based on common law, we conclude that the Mayor and 
the Council had independent authority to discharge Ward, 
without a hearing, notice or cause. 
Ward, nevertheless, contends that he has a right to appeal 
his discharge under sections 10-3-1105 and -1106. Section 
10-3-1105 provides that "[a]11 appointive officers and 
employees of municipalities, other than members of the PQUce 
departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and 
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation 
of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only as 
hereinafter provided." (Emphasis added.) Ward argues that he 
does not fall within the exception because he is not a member 
of a "police department" per se, but a city marshal with 
appointed assistants. However, we read sections 10-3-1105 and 
-1106 as specifically excluding him. Other sections in chapter 
10 use the term "chief of police" interchangeably with "city 
marshal." See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918 (1986). As 
3. Ward contends that the trial court erroneously applied Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-6-32 which was repealed in 1977. This section 
provided for the term of employment and removal of appointed 
officers, without cause, in first, second and third class 
cities. This section was not replaced with a statute expressly 
directing the removal of chiefs of police in third class 
cities. However, in light of our analysis that Ward does not 
have a right to appeal and that he can be removed without 
cause, we find that the trial court, nevertheless, reached the 
correct result. Therefore, the trial court's application of 
section 10-6-32 was harmless error. 
880713-CA 5 
Chief of Police, we hold that Ward is both a member of a 
-police department- and the head of that -department.-
Ward also argues that even if he falls within the 
exception to section 10-3-1105 because he is a chief of 
police, nevertheless, the language in the second sentence of 
section 10-3-1106 applies to -any officer.- Because these 
sections must be read together and should harmonize with the 
purpose of the whole act, Jensen v, Interrooimtain Health Care, 
Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984), we hold that the language 
-as hereinafter provided- in section 10-3-1105 specifically 
modifies the sections that follow. -Separate parts of [an] 
act should not be construed in isolation from the rest of the 
act.- id. S&s also Stahl v, Utah Transit Autht, 618 p.2d 
480, 481 (Utah 1980). Therefore, -any officer- as appears in 
section 10-3-1106 must mean any officer not excluded in 
section 10-3-1105. 
Our holding is in keeping with the rationale behind the 
power to discharge a chief of police without a hearing, 
notice, or cause. Since the chief of police is appointed to 
carry out the policies of the mayor -[t]he position of chief 
of police is clearly recognized as different than that of any 
other position in the police department for the obvious reason 
that the chief of police is in a position of making and 
carrying out policy for the mayor." Carlson, 681 P.2d at 
1335. The result is there is no protected property interest 
in the position of chief of police. I£. at 1337.4 
4. Ward contends that he has a right to appeal under the 
-Richfield City Police Department Policies and Procedures 
Manual.- The pertinent sections of the manual provide that a 
member of the department may request a review of disciplinary 
action by submitting a written request to the chief of police 
and that dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield 
City Appeals Board. However, these sections specifically 
pertain to officers under the supervision of the chief of 
polfce and not to the chief himself. 
880713-CA 6 
The summary judgment is affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
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June 14, 1989 OPINION 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the District 
Court herein be, and the same is, affirmed. 
Opinion of the Court by RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, Judge; JUDITH M. 
BILLINGS and REGNAL W. GARFF, Judges, concur. 
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(IN NUMERICAL ORDER) 
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L M H CODE 
lV86->9*7 Cities and Towns 10-3-917. 
the second class shall be an office of record for all 
maps, plans, plats, profiles, drawings, final estim-
ates, specifications and contracts which in any way 
relate to the public improvements and engineering 
affairs of the city The city engineer shall be custo-
dian of all drawings and documents above menti-
oned !*T7 
10-3-9O4. Books and supplies - Recording, filing 
and inspection. 
The city engineer's office shall be supplied with 
all necessary books, cases and supplies for recording 
wd filing as required. The city engineer shall record 
and file all drawings and documents pertaining to 
public lands and improvements. Those made in his 
office shall be placed on record as soon as compl-
eted and shall then be open for public inspections, 
and any person copying the same or taking notes 
therefrom may do so in penal only. He shall keep 
the records and files in good condition and turn the 
same over to ht$ successor in office. He shall allow 
no alteration, mutilation or changes to be made in 
any matter of record, and shall be held strictly acc-
ountable for the same. \m 
10-3-905. Fees to be paid in advance. 
The city engineer shall not record any drawings or 
instruments, or file any papers or notices, or furnish 
any copies, or render any service connected with his 
office, until the fees for the same are paid or tend-
ered as prescribed by law or ordinance. \m 
10-3-906. Seil. 
The citv engineer shall be provided with a seal by 
(he city for his use, containing the words ' 
City, Utah, Engineering Department* The seal shall 
be affixed to every certification approval. \m 
10-3-907. Recordation not to interfere with other 
recordation. 
The recording or filing of any drawing or instru-
ment in the city engineer's office shall not interfere 
or conflict in any way with the recording or filing of 
fhe same in other offices of record \m 
10-3-903. Noncompliance a misdemeanor. 
Any city engineer who fails to comply with sect-
ions 10-3-903 through 10-3-907 is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. \*n 
10-3-909. Police and fire departments in cities of 
the first and second class. 
The board of city commissioners or other gover-
ning body of each aty of the first or the second 
class shall create, support, maintain and control a 
police department and may create, support, main-
tain and control a fire department m their respective 
C
» l « .
 tV7f 
10-3-910. Heads of departments and subordinate 
officers. 
The administration o( the police and fire depart-
m
*nts shall consist of a chief of the department and 
such officers, members, employees and agents as the 
board of commissioners may by ordinance prescribe, 
iad.ihe-board ofc-^omimwoners shall-appoint^ the 
heads of such departments. im 
10-3-911. Removal of departmental heads. 
The chief of the police or fire department of the 
Cll
«es may at any time be removed, without a trial, 
"«nng or opportunity to be heard, by the board of 
COrnmissioners whenever in its opinion the good of 
,hc service will be served thereby Its action m 
^moving the chief of either department shall be 
,n
*l and conclusive and shall not be received or 
c
*Ned m question before any court. The city reco-
ver shall forthwith notify in writing the removed 
ch,cf of his removal, and it shall not be necessary to 
state any cause for removal. From the time of not-
ification the person removed shall not in any case be 
entitled to any salary or compensation irn 
20-3-912. Department heads m»y suspend 
subordinates. 
The chief of each department may at any time 
suspend any subordinate officers, member, empl-
oyee or agent employed therein when in his judg-
ment the good of the service demands it, for a 
penod of time not exceeding 15 days, and during 
the time of suspension the person suspended shall 
not be entitled to any salary or compensation wha-
tsoever \rn 
10-3-913. Powers and duties of chief of police. 
The chief of police shall, in the discharge of his 
duties, have the same powers, responsibilities as 
sheriffs and constables; he shall suppress riots, dis-
turbances and breaches of the peace, and apprehend 
all persons committing any offense against the laws 
of the state or the ordinances of the city. He shall at 
all times diligently and faithfully discharge his duties 
and enforce all ordinances and regulations of the 
city for the preservation of peace, good order and 
the protection of the rights and property of all 
persons. \m 
10*3-914. Police officers - Powers and duties. 
The police officers of any municipality shall have 
the same powers and responsibilities as constables. 
It shall be the duty of the police force in any mun-
icipality at all times to preserve the public peace, 
prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress 
riots, protect persons and property, remove nuisa-
nces existing in the public streets, roads and high-
ways, enforce every law relating to the suppression 
of offenses, and perform all duties required of them 
by ordinance or resolution. \m 
10-3-915. Rights to arrest without warrant. 
The .members of the police force shall have the 
power and authority, without process, to arrest and 
take into custody any person who shall commit or 
threaten or attempt to commit in the presence of the 
officer, or within his view, any breach of the peace, 
or any offense directly prohibited by the laws of this 
state or by ordinance. \m 
10-3-916. Recorder, treasurer, marshal In dties of 
third class and towns. 
In each city of the third class and town on or 
before the first Monday in February following a 
municipal election the mayor, with the advice and 
consent of the city council, shall appoint a qualified 
person to each of the offices of city recorder, trea-
surer, and marshal The city recorder shall be ex 
officio the city auditor and shall perform the duties 
of such office. The mayor, with the advice and 
consent of the council, may also appoint and fill 
vacancies in all such officers and agents as may be 
provided for by law or ordinance, except as is oth-
erwise provided by law. All officers shall continue in 
office until their successors are appointed and qua-
lified. !«J 
10-3*917. Engineer In dties of the third class and 
towns. 
The governing body of cities of the third class and 
towns may by ordinance establish the office of 
municipal engineer and prescribe the duties and 
obligations for that office which are consistent with 
the duties and obligations of the city engineer in 
cities of the first and second class. Where a city of 
the third class or town uses the engineer employed 
by the county in which the municipality is located, 
the municipality may, by ordinance prescribe for its 
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10-3-918. Cities and 
municipal engineer either the duties of a municipal 
engineer or, if different, the duties of the county 
engineer, or a combination of duties. \m 
10-3-918. Chief of police or marshal in third class 
cities and towns. 
In cities of the third class and towns, the chief of 
police or marshal shall exercise and perform such 
duties as may be prescribed by the governing body 
The chief of police or marshal shall be under the 
direction, control and supervision of the mayor. The 
chief of police or marshal may with the consent of 
the mayor, appoint assistants to the chief of police 
or marshal. I9t3 
10-3-919. Powers, duties and obligations of 
police chief, marshal and their assistants in cities 
of the third class and towns. 
The chief of police, marshals and their assistants 
in cities of the third class and towns shall have all of 
the powers, rights and duties respectively conferred 
on such officers in sections 10-3-913 through 10-
3-915. t in 
10-3-920. Bail commissioner - Powers and 
duties. 
The mayor of any city of the third class, with the 
advice and consent of the city council, and the 
board of commissioners in other cities, may appoint 
from among the officers and members of the police 
department of the city one or more discreet persons 
to be known as bail commissioners, who shall have 
and exercise all the powers which are now or here-
after may be conferred by law upon justices of the 
peace or judges of the circuit court in respect to the 
fixing of bail of persons arrested within the corpo-
rate limits of the city for misdemeanors under the 
laws of the state or for violation of the city ordin-
ances, and to the taking and the approving of the 
same. Any person who has been ordered by any 
such bail commissioner to give bail may deposit the 
amount thereof in money with such bail commissi-
oner. I9t3 
10-3-921. Fines • Collection by bail 
commissioner - Accounting. 
In addition to their duties in respect to the fixing 
of bail, bail commissioners shall have power on 
nonjudicial days, and after the hour of 5 o'clock 
p.m. and before the hour of 9 o'clock a.m. on 
judicial days, to collect and receipt for moneys 
tendered in payment of the fine of any person 
serving sentence in default of the payment of such 
fine. Ail moneys collected by bail commissioners 
shall be accounted for at least once a month to the 
clerk of the circuit court in cities where a municipal 
department of the circuit court exists, and in cities 
where such department does not exist such accoun-
ting shall be made to the city treasurer, or in cases 
arising under the state laws to the county treasurer. 
irn 
10-3-922. Term of bail commissioners • Salary 
- Bond and oath. 
Commissioners appointed under this article shall 
serve at the pleasure of the governing body or 
mayor appointing them, and shall receive no com-
pensation as such. Before entering upon their duties 
as bail commissioners they shall take and subscribe 
an oath to faithfully and impartially discharge the 
duties of their office, and shall give bond to the city 
wherein they are appointed, with two good and 
sufficient individual sureties or with a single corpo-
rate surety, to be approved by the governing body 
or mayor appointing them, which bond shall be in 
the sum of $2,500, conditioned for the faithful 
performance of their duties as such commissioners, 
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and that they will well and truly account for and 
turn over to the clerk of the circuit court or to the 
treasurer of their respective cities or counties, as the 
case may be at such times as may be designated by 
the governing body of the city, all moneys, bonds, 
property and records coming into their hands as 
such commissioners, and that at the expiration of 
their term of office they will surrender and turn 
over as aforesaid all funds, bonds properly, papers 
and records then in their hands pertaining to their 
respective offices Sun upon any such bond may be 
brought by any county, city or person injured \m 
10-3-923. City and town justices of the peace -
Appointment - Vacancies - Disqualification • 
Compensation - Payment of fees, fines, 
forfeitures or other sums to treasurer. 
(1) Each municipality which docs not have a 
municipal department of the circuit court may, in 
the manner it appoints other oificcrs, appoint a 
justice of the peace Justices of (he peace shall be 
appointed to terms of four years beginning the first 
Monday in February. 1980, provided that justices 
now holding office or appointed to fill any vacancy 
shall hold office until the succes»or is duly appoi-
nted and qualified Municipal justice* of the peace 
may be removed from office in the same manner as 
county justices. 
(2) If a vacancy bhall occur in the office of a 
municipal justice, the mayor or town president, by 
and with the consent of the governing body, shall 
forthwith fill such vacancy by appointment for the 
unexpired term The person appointed shall qualify 
in the same manner as a municipal justice, and shall 
have and exercise all the powers conferred by law 
upon such municipal justice In case any municipal 
justice shall for any reason be unable or disqualified 
to perform the duties o( his office, or shall be 
absent, the mayor or town president shall appoint 
some other justice of the peace residing within the 
county to act as the municipal justice of the peace 
pro tempore, and he shall have and discharge the 
duties of [sicl such municipal justice might have, but 
during the existence of such disability or absence 
only 
(3) The salary of the municipal justices of the 
peace shall be set bv ordinance in the manner pres-
cribed by section 78 5-29 
(4) All fees, fines, forfeitures or any other sums 
collected by the justice of the peace shall be paid to 
the municipal treasurer within seven days of receipt. 
(5) Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of a 
municipal justice of the peace, the municipality may 
contract with the county or another municipality to 
share the services of a justice The contract shall be 
for the same term as the term of the justice whose 
services are sought Municipalities may contract for 
the services of a county or municipal justice during 
their entire term at any time there is a vacancy in 
the office of municipal justice Vacancies may be 
created by refusing to reappoint a person to the 
office of justice of the peace im 
10-3-924. Appointment of manager. 
The governing body of any city or town may by 
ordinance establish a manager form of government 
and appoint any person to be known as the 
manager irn 
10-3-925. Term of office 
The manager shall serve at the pleasure of the 
governing body except that the governing body may 
employ the manager for a term not to exceed three 
years The term of employment may be renewed at 
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any time Any person serving as manager of a 
municipality under this section may be removed with 
or without cause by a majority vote o( (he gover 
mng body 1977 
10-3-926. Duties of the manager 
The governing body shall, by ordinance or resol 
ution, prescribe the powers, duties and obligations 
of ihe manager if77 
10-3-927. Legislative powers and official position 
of the mayor not delegated. 
The legislative and judicial powers of the mayor, 
his position as chairman of the governing body and 
any ex officio position the mayor shall hold shall 
not be delegated to the manager im 
10-3-923. Attorney. 
The city attorney shall have the duty to prosecute 
violations of city ordinances and shall have the same 
powers in respect to violations of city ordinances as 
may be exercised by a county attorney in respect to 
violations of state law, including, but not limited to, 
granting immunity to witnesses for violations of city 
ordinances \m 
Part 10. Civil Service Commission 
10-3-1001. Subordinates in police, health, and rire 
departments to be appointed from list 
10-3-1002. Classified civil service • Employment 
constituting. 
10-3-1003 Commission • Number, term, vacancies 
10*3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners - balarv 
Removal 
10-3-1005. Organization of commission - Secretary 
Offices. 
10-3-1006. Rules and regulations - Printing and 
distribution. 
10-3-1007. Examinations. 
10-3-1008 Appointments from civil service list • 
Probation period. 
10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for position -
Number • Eligible lists, removal. 
10-3-1010. Promotions - Basis • Certification of 
applicants. 
10-3-1011. Temporary employees. 
10-3-1012. Discharge by department head - Appeal to 
commission • Hearing and decision 
10-3-1013. Annual and special reports by commission 
10-3-1001. Subordinates in police, health, and 
fire departments to be appointed from list. 
The head of each of the police and fire departm-
ents of cities of the first and second class and the 
health officer in cities of the first class shall, by and 
with the advice and consent of the board of city 
commissioners, and subject to the rules and regula-
tions of the civil service commission, appoint from 
the classified civil service list furnished by the civil 
service commission all subordinate officers cmplo 
>ees, members or agents in his department, and in 
like manner fill all vacancies in the same i m 
10-3-1002. Classified civil service - Employment 
constituting. 
The classified civil service shall consist of alt 
places of employment now existing or hereafter 
created in or under the police department and the 
fire department of each city of the first and second 
class, and the health department in cities of the first 
class, except the head of (he departments, deputy 
chiefs of the police and fire departments and assis-
tant chiefs of the police department in cities of the 
first and second class, and the members of the 
board o f health of the departments No appointm 
ems to any of the places of employment constituting 
the classified civil service in the departments shall be 
made except according to law and under the rules 
and regulations of the civil service commission The 
head of each of the departments may, and the 
deputy chiefs of the police and fire departments and 
assistant chiefs of the police department shall, be 
appointed from the classified civil service, and upon 
the expiration of his term or upon the appointment 
of a successor shall be returned thereto 1*77 
10-3-1003 Commission - Number, term, 
vacancies. 
In each city of the first and second class there 
shall be a civil service commission, consisting of 
three members appointed by the board of commis-
sioners Their term of office shall be six years, but 
they shall be appointed so that the term of office of 
one member shall expire on <he 30th day of June of 
each even-numbered year If a vacancy occurs in 
the civil service commission, it shall be filled by 
appointment by the board of city commissioners for 
the unexpired term \m 
10-3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners • 
Salary - Removal. 
Not more than two members of the civil service 
commission shall at any one time be of the same 
political party No member of the civil service 
commission shall during his tenure of office hold 
any other public office, or be a candidate for any 
other public office Each member shall receive $25 
for each meeting of the commission which he shall 
attend, but shall not receive more than SI00 in any 
one month In case of misconduct, inability or 
willful neglect in the performance of the duties of 
the office by any member, the member may be 
removed from office by the board of city commiss-
ioners by a majority vote of the entire membership, 
but the member shall, if he so desires, have the 
opportunity to be heard in defense \rn 
10-3-1005. Organization of commission -
Secretary - Offices. 
The civil service commission shall organize by 
selecting one of us members chairman, and shall 
appoint as secretary one of the available officers or 
employees of the city, who shall act and serve 
without additional compensation. The secretary shall 
keep a record of all meetings of the civil service 
commission and of us work and shall perform such 
other services as the commission may require, and 
shall have the custody of the books and records of 
the commission The board of city commissioners 
shall provide suitable accomodations and equipment 
to enable the civil service commission to attend to 
its business i m 
10-3-1006. Rules and regulations - Printing and 
distribution. 
The civil service commission shall make all nece 
ssary rules and regulations to carry out the purposes 
of this part and for examinations, appointments and 
promotions All rules and regulations shall be 
printed by the civil service commission for distrib-
ution |?T7 
10-3-1007 Examinations, 
All applicants for employment in the classified 
civil service shall be subject to examination, which 
shall be public, competitive and free Examinations 
shall be held at such times and places as the civil 
service commission shall from time to time deter-
mine, and shall be for the purpose of determining 
the qualifications of applicants for positions Exa-
minations shall be practical and shall fairly test the 
fitness in every respect of the persons examined to 
discharge the duties of the positions to which they 
^ ode • Co ~
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seek to be appointed, and shall include tests of 
physical qualifications and health 1977 
10-3-1008. Appointments from civil service list -
Probation p e n o d . 
In all cases the appointing power shall notify the 
civil service commiss ion of each separate position to 
be filled, and shall fill such place by the appoint-
ment o f one of the persons certified by the commi-
ssion therefor Such appointment shall be on prob-
ation, and of a character and for a period to be 
prescribed by the civil service commiss ion im 
10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for position 
• Number - Eligible lists, removal. 
Whenever a position in the classified civil service 
is to be filled, the civil service commission shall as 
soon as possible certify to the appointing power the 
names of five persons to fill such position from 
those persons having the highest standing in the 
eligible list but a lesser number may be certified 
when there is not the required number on the elig-
ible list. If more than one position is available in the 
same department, the civil service commission shall 
also certify to the appointing power one additional 
name for each additional position to be filled AH 
persons not appointed shall be restored to their rel-
ative positions on the eligible list All persons who 
have been on the eligible list for two years without 
appointment shall be removed therefrom and can 
only be returned thereto upon regular examination 
1983 
10-3-1010. Promot ions - Basis - Certification 
of applicants. 
The civil service commiss ion shall provide for 
promotion in the classified civil service on the basis 
of ascertained merit, seniority in service and stan-
ding obtained by competit ive examination, and shall 
provide, in ail cases where practicable, that vacan-
cies shall be filled by promotion from the members 
o f the next lower rank as submit themselves for the 
examination aad promot ion . The civil service com-
mission shall certify to the appointing power the 
names o f not more than five applicants having the 
highest rating for each promot ion I9W 
10-3-1011. Temporary employees . 
The head of each department, with the advice and 
consent of the board o f city commiss ioners , may 
employ any person for temporary work only, 
without making the appointment from the certified 
list, but the appointment shall not be longer than 
one month in the same calendar year, and under no 
circumstances shall the temporary employee be 
appointed to a permanent position unless he shall 
have been duly certified by the civil service commi-
ssion as in other cases 1977 
10-3-1012. Discharge by department head -
Appeal to commiss ion - Hearing and decis ion. 
All persons in the classified civil service may be 
removed from off ice or employment by the head of 
the department for misconduct , incompetency or 
failure to perform his duties or failure to observe 
properly the rules o f the department, but subject to 
appeal by the discharged person to the civil service 
commiss ion A n y person discharged may, within 
five days from the issuing by the head of the depa-
rtment of the order discharging him, appeal there 
from to the civil service commiss ion , which shall 
fully hear and determine the matter The discharged 
person shall be entitled to appear in person and to 
have counsel and a public hearing The finding and 
decision of the civil service commiss ion upon the 
hearing shall be certified to the head of the depart 
ment from whose order the appeal is taken, and 
shall be final, and shall forthwith be enforced and 
followed by him 1977 
10-3-1013. Annual and special reports b> 
commiss ion. 
The civil service commiss ion shall 11 December of 
each year make an annual report to the board of 
city commissioners and shall make as many special 
reports as the board of city commissioners shall 
request i»77 
Part 11. Personnel Rules and Benefits 
10-3-1101 through 10-3.1102 Replied 
10-3-1103. Sickness, disability and death benefits 
10-3-1104 Library personnel - Monthly wa^e 
deductions and matching turns • Time of inclusion. 
10-3-1105. Appointive officers and employees 
Duration and termination o( term of office 
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer « Appeals - Board • 
Procedure. 
10-3-1107 Cost of living adjustment • Price index used. 
10-3-1101 through 10-3-1102. Repealed. iw 
10-3-1103. Sickness, disability and death benefits. 
(1) The governing body of each municipality may 
maintain as to ail elective or appointive officers and 
employees , including heads o f departments , a system 
for the payment o f health, dental , hospital , medical, 
disability and death benefits to be financed and 
administered in a manner and payable upon the 
terms and condit ions as the governing body of the 
municipality may by ordinance or resolution presc-
ribe 
(2) The governing bodies of the municipalities 
may create and admimsicr personnel benetit prog-
rams separately or jointly with other municipalities 
or other political subdivisions of the Stale of Utah 
or associations thereof \m 
10-3-1104. Library personnel - Monihlv wage 
deductions and matching sums - Time of 
inclusion. 
(1) The librarians, assistants and employees of any 
public library may, at the discretion of the board of 
directors of the library, be included within and 
participate in the pension, retirement sickness, dis-
ability and death benefit svstcm established under 
section 10-3-1103 In the event the librarian, 
assistants and employees of the municipality are 
included within and participate in the system, there 
shall be deducted from the monthly wage or salary 
of the librarian, assistants and employees and paid 
into the system, a percentage of their wage or salary 
equal to the percentage of the monthly wage or 
salary of other employees o f the municipality which 
is paid into the system Also there shall be paid 
monthly into the system from the funds of the 
library a further sum equal to the total amount 
deducted monthly from the wage or salary of the 
librarian, assistants and employees and paid into the 
retirement system 
(2) Where the election by the board of directors 
of any library for inclusion of its librarian, assist-
ants and employees within the svstcm ol any muni-
cipality is subsequent to the establishment of the 
system, the inclusion mav begin i s of the date of the 
establishment of the svstcm or as of the date of the 
election as shall be determined b> the board of dir 
cctors If inclusion \s as of the date ot the es t ibhs 
hment of the system there shall be paid into the 
system in addition to the subsequent monthly wage 
deductions and matching sums a sum equal to the 
aggregate of monthly pasroil dcdutt ions and mate 
hing sums (hat would have iccrued during the 
period beginning with the establishment of the 
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<N<;(cm and ending with the election had the libra-
pan, assistants and employees been included within 
{he system from its establishment. trn 
lO-J-llOS. Appointive officers and employees -
Duration and termination of term of office. 
All appointive officers and employees of munici-
palities, other than members of the police depart-
ments, fire departments, heads of departments, and 
superintendents, shall hold their employment 
uiihout limitation of time, being subject to disch-
arge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided. \m 
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer - Appeals • 
Board - Procedure. 
(1) No officer or employee covered by section 10-
1-1105 shall be discharged or transferred to a 
position with less remuneration because of his poli-
tics or religious belief, or incident to, or through 
changes, either in the elective officers, governing 
bodv. or heads of departments. In all cases where 
an\ officer or employee is discharged or transferred 
from one position to another for any reason, he 
shall have the right to appeal the discharge or tran-
sfer to a board to be known as the appeal board 
which shall consist of five members, three of whom 
shall be chosen by and from the appointive officers 
and employees, and two of whom shall be members 
of the governing body 
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written 
notice of the appeal with the recorder within ten 
dass after the discharge or transfer Upon the filing 
of the appeal, the city recorder shall forthwith refer 
a copy of the same to the appeal board. Upon 
receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, 
the appeal board shall forthwith commence its inv-
estigation, take and receive evidence and fully hear 
and determine the matter which relates to the cause 
for the discharge or transfer 
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in 
person and to be represented by counsel, to have a 
public hearing, to confront the witness whose testi-
mony is to be considered, and to examine the evid-
ence to be considered by the appeal board 
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the 
discharge or transfer, the officer or employee may 
have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing 
bodv whose decision shall be final. In the event the 
appeal board does not uphold the discharge or tra-
nsfer the case shall be closed and no further proce-
edings shall be had. 
(5) The decision of the appeal board shall be by 
secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder 
*«th 15 days from the date the matter is referred to 
»« The board may, in its decision, provide that an 
employee shall receive his salary for the period of 
time during which he is discharged, or any defici-
ent \ m salary for the period he was transferred to a 
Position of less remuneration but not to exceed a 15 
da\ period. In no case shall the appointive officer or 
employee be discharged or transferred, where an 
appeal is taken, except upon a concurrence of at 
•east a majority of the membership of the governing 
body of the municipality 
(M In the event that the appeal board does not 
uPhoId the discharge, or transfer, the recorder shall 
cenif> the decision to the employee affected, and 
a
'<o to the head of the department from whose 
0rder the appeal was taken The employee shall be 
Paid his salary, commencing with the next working 
da\ following the certification by the recorder of the 
appeal board's decision, provided that the empl 
0vee or officer, concerned reports for his assigned 
duties during that next working day 
(7) The method and manner of choosing the 
members of the appeal board, and the designation 
of their terms of office shall be prescribed by the 
governing body of each municipality by ordinance, 
but the provisions for choosing the three members 
from the appointed officers and emplovccs shall in 
no way restrict a free selection of members by the 
appointive officers and employees of the municipa-
lity \m 
10-3-U07. Cost of living adjustment - Price 
index used. 
(1) The governing body of each municipality may, 
in their discretion, adopt a plan to allow any person 
who qualifies under this part to receive a cost of 
living adjustment m their monthly retirement allo-
wance; but the adjustment allowed shall be a perc-
entage, not to exceed one hundred per cent, of the 
sum as would restore the full purchasing power of 
each person's original unmodified pension allow-
ance as it was in the calendar year in which the 
retirement giving rise to the pension occurred 
(2) The amount necessary to restore the full pur-
chasing power of the original unmodified pension 
allowance shall be computed from the consumers 
price index published by the United States Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
(3) Adjustments may be effective as of the date of 
this act or at any subsequent date set by the gover-
ning body A municipality may choose to pay any 
per cent to the maximum amount provided that such 
percentage be paid to all qualified persons equally 
1177 
Part 12. Alternative Forms of Municipal 
Government 
10-3-1201. Citation of act. 
10-3-1202. Legislative finding. 
10-3-1203. Election requirements and procedure for 
organization under optional form of government. 
10-3-1204. Application of act 
10-3-1205. Rights, powers, and duties of municipality 
operating under optional form. 
10-3-1206. Limitation on changing form of government. 
10-3-1207. Disapproval o( optional form by voters -
Limitation on resubmission. 
10-3-1209. Election of officers • When new government 
operative - Compensation of officials without position 
In sew government. 
10-3-1209 Council-mayor and council-manager form 
defined 
10-3-1210 Functions of Ihe council 
10-.3-1211. Council members - Qualifications - Term* 
o( office. 
10-3-1212. Meetings of council - Access to records. 
10-3-1213. Chairmen of councils - Power to call 
witnesses and administer oath - Quorum - Voting 
procedure 
10-3-1214. Ordinance adoption under council-mayor 
form - Powers of mayor. 
10-3-1215 Rules and regulations for government of 
council. 
10-3-1216. Council members elected from districts • 
Boundary • Adjustments. 
10-3-1217. Limitations on actions and authority of 
council members - Investigatory committees. 
10-3-1218. Vacancy in council 
10-3-1219. Council-mayor form - Powers and duties 
of mayor 
10-3-1219 5 Council-mayor form - Ordinance* on 
transfer of municipal property and regulation of 
subdivisions or annexations 
10-3-1220. Council-mayor form - Appointment of 
chief administrative officer 
10-3-1221 Municipal administrative code In 
council-mayor form 
10-3-1222. Council-mayor form - \ aeano In office of 
mayor. 
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52-2-1. Public Officers 
justify when so required or to furnish addition3' 
sureties when required, as herein provided, tPc 
xooat6 OT oWicer cYiargeo. wnYi the duty o\ approving 
the bond of such officer shall declare such office 
vacant within sixty days after notice personal^ 
served upon the officer, and at the expiration o( 
said sixty-day period such office shall becort1* 
vacant unless such sureties justify or addition3* 
qualified sureties be furnished within said period 
Chapter 2, Failure to Qualify for Office 
52-2-1. Time in which to qualify - Failure -
Office declared vacant. 
Whenever any person duly elected or appointed *° 
any office of the state or any of its political subo4*' 
visions, fails to qualify for such office within su*y 
days after the date of beginning of the term o( 
office for which he was elected or appointed, su£n 
office shall thereupon become vacant and shall t>c 
filled as provided by law Whenever the bond of arW 
officer of the state or of any of its political subdiv* 
isions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise 
becomes void or of no effect, without anothcr 
proper bond being given so that continuance 0* 
bonded protection is afforded, the office of su£n 
officer shall thereupon become vacant and shall Pe 
official who has failed on the effective date of th ,s 
act to qualify for the position to which he w*s 
elected or appointed, shall be deemed to corf16 
within the provisions of this act, and the office o( 
such officer shall become vacant at the end of for*y 
davs after the effective date of this act unless leg3* 
bond is given before the expiration of such period 
and such office shall be filled as provided by law 
Chapter 3. Prohibiting Employment of 
Relatives 
52-3-1. Employment of relatives prohibited -
Exceptions. 
52-3-2. Each day of violation a separate offense. 
52-3-3. Penalty. 
52-3-4. Exception in towns. 
52-3-1. Employment of relatives prohibited • 
Exceptions. 
It is unlawful for any person holding any posui0n 
the compensation for which is paid out of pub!'c 
funds to employ, appoint, or vote for the appoint" 
TTieiu-uf: Ins ut tiei fathet r*>t»utfter,'husband, wlfgT 
son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephev*. 
law, brother-in-law, ststcr-in-law son in-
law, or daughter-in-law in or to any position 0r 
employment, when the salary, wages, pay or cor*1" 
pensation of such appointee is to be paid out of any 
public funds. It is unlawful for such appointee l° 
accept or to retain such employment when his initial 
appointment thereto was made in contravention o( 
the foregoing sentence by a person within the 
degrees of consanguinity or affinity therein specified 
having the direct power o( employment or appoint-
ment to such position, or by a board or group of 
which such person is a member 
The provisions of this section shall not apply 
among others to the following employment situ**-
ions 
(a) Where the employee or appointee was appoi-
nted or employed by a department or agency o( thc 
UTAH cooi-
—swg 
state of Utah or a political subdivision thereof pr^. 
to the time during which said related perso* 
assumed sai6 p\ittoc povtoTmifotTem 
(b) Where the employee or appointee was appoi-
nted or employed subsequent to the time during 
which said related person assumed said public pow 
ition but prior to the effective date of this act tad 
his appointment was not in contravention of the* 
provisions of this chapter in effect at the time of 
appointment 
(c) Where the employee or appointee was or a 
eligible or qualified to be employed by a department 
or agency of the state of Utah or a political subdi. 
vision thereof as the result of his compliance with; 
civil service laws or regulations and merit system' 
laws or regulations or as the result of a certification/ 
as to his qualification and fitness by a department* 
agency or subdivision of the state authorized so,to 
do by law 
(d) Where the employee or appointee was or l» 
employed by the employing unit because he was or 
is the only person available, qualified or eligible for 
the position ~\m 
52-3-2. Each day of violation a separate offense. 
Each day any such person, father, mother, 
husband, wife, son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, 
aunt, nephew, niece, first cousins, moth-x-in-law, 
father-in-law, brother in-law, sister-in-law, 
son in-"iaw or daughter-in-law is retained in 
office by any of said officials >hall be regarded as i 
separate offense lis 
52-3-3 Penalty 
Any person violating any of the provisions of thu 
chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor i« 
52-3-4 Exception in towns. 
In towns, this chapter shall not apply to th< 
employment of uncles, aunts nephews, nieces ot 
cousins \m 
Chapter 4. Open and Public Meetings 
52-4-1. Declaration of public policy 
52-4-2. Definitions. 
52-4*3. Meetings open to the public - Exceptions. 
52-4-4. Cosed meeting held upon vote of members • 
Business - Reasons for meeting recorded 
52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings - Chance meetings 
and social meetings excluded - Disruption of meetings. 
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
52-4-7 Minutes of open meetings • Public records -
Recording of meetings. 
52-4-4 Suit to avoid final action - Limitation • 
Exceptions. 
'52-4-9. Enforcement or en spier • Suit lo compel 
compliance. 
52-4-1. Declaration of public policy 
In enacting this chapter, the legislature finds and 
declares that the state, its agencies and political 
subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the 
people's business It is the intent of the law that 
their actions be taken openly and that their delibe-
rations be conducted openly trrr 
52-4-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act 
(I) "Meeting" means the convening of a public 
body, with a quorum present, whether corporal or 
by means of electronic equipment, for the purpose 
of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the 
public body has jurisdiction or advisory power. This 
chapter shall not apply to chance meetings. 
"Convening/ as us<d in this subsection, means the 
calling of a meeting of a public body by a person or 
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persons authorized to do so for (he express purpose 
0i discussing or acting upon a subject over which 
fhai public body has jurisdiction 
(2) "Public body" means any administrative, 
3dMSory, executive or legislative body of the state or 
t> political subdivisions which consists of two or 
more persons that expends, disburses or is supported 
i, whole or in part by tax revenue and which is 
vested with the authority to make decisions regar-
jing the public's business "Public bod>" docs not 
nJude any political party, group or caucus or rules 
or sifting committees of the legislature 
(*) "Quorum* means a simple majority of the 
-Membership of a public body, unless otherwise 
jefined by applicable law, but a quorum docs not 
mtlude a meeting of two elected officials by them-
selves when no action, either formal or informal, is 
iaken on a subject over which these elected officials 
have jurisdiction mi 
52-4-3. Meetings open to the public -
Exceptions. 
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed 
pursuant to sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5 \m 
52-4-4 Closed meeting held upon vote of 
members • Business - Reasons for meeting 
recorded. 
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirma-
uve vote of two-thirds of the members of the 
public body present at an open meeting for which 
notice is given pursuant to section 52-4-6, prov-
ided, a quorum is present No closed meeting is 
allowed except as to matters exempted under section 
<2 4 5, provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, 
regulation, contract, or appointment shall be appr 
o\ed at a closed meeting The reason or reasons for 
holding a closed meeting and the vote, either for or 
against the proposition to hold such a meeting, cast 
b> each member by name shall be entered on the 
iiinuies of the meeting. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
require any meeting to be closed to the public i m 
52-4-5 Purposes of closed meetings - Chinee 
meetings and social meetings excluded -
Disruption of meetings. 
(1) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to 
action 52-4-4 for any of the following purposes. 
(a) Discussion of the character, professional 
competence, or physical or mental health of an 
ndmduai, 
(b) Strategy sessions with respect to collective 
bargaining, litigation, or purchase of real property, 
(c) Discussion regarding deployment of security 
Personnel or devices, and 
(d) Investigative proceedings regarding allegations 
°f criminal misconduct 
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance 
fneenng or a social meeting No chance meeting or 
VOc,ai meeting shall be used to circumvent this 
chapter 
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of 
anY person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the 
fxicnt that orderly conduct is seriously comprom 
*** IfT7 
5
*-4-6 Public notice of meetings. 
0) Any public body which holds regular meetings 
<nat are scheduled in advance over the course of a 
>car shall give public notice at least once each year 
of ,ls annual meeting schedule as provided in this 
Action The public notice shall specify the date. 
"
me, and place of such meetings 
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of 
c ^ ^ r — -
*°
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subsection (1) of this section, each public body shall 
give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the 
agenda, date, time and place of each of its meetings 
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by 
(a) Posting written notice at the principal office 
of the public body, or if no such office exists, at the 
building where the meeting is to be held and 
(b) Providing notice to at least one newspaper 
of general circulation within the geographic jurisdi-
ction of the public body, or to a local media corre 
spondent 
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it 
is necessary for a public body to hold an emergency 
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or 
urgent nature, the notice requirements of section 52-
4-6(2) may be disregarded and the best notice 
practicable given No such emergency meeting of a 
public body shall be held unless an attempt has been 
made to notify ail of its members and a majority 
votes in the affirmative to hold the meeting. w i 
52-4-7. Minutes of open meetings - Public 
records - Recording of meetings. 
(1) Written minutes shall be kept of all open 
meetings Such minutes shall include 
(a) The date, time and place of the meeting, 
(b) The names of members present and absent, 
(c) The substance of all matters proposed, discu-
ssed, or decided, and a record, by individual 
member, of votes taken, 
(d) The names of ail citizens who appeared and 
the substance in brief of their testimony, 
(c) Any other information that any member req-
uests be entered in the minutes 
(2) Written minutes shall be kept of all closed 
meetings Such minutes shall include 
(a) The date, time and place of the meeting, 
(b) The names of members present and absent, 
(c) The names of ail others present except where 
such disclosure would infringe on the confidence 
necessary to fulfill the original purpose of closing 
the meeting. 
(3) The minutes are public records and shall be 
available within a reasonable time after the meeting 
(4) All or any part of an open meeting may be 
recorded by any person in attendance, provided, the 
recording docs not interfere with the conduct of the 
meeting i m 
52-4-4. Suit to avoid final action • Limitation 
• Exceptions. 
Any final action taken in violation of sections 52-
4-3 and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of comp 
ctent jurisdiction Suit to void final action shall be 
commenced within 90 days after the action except 
that with respect to any final action concerning the 
issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days 
after the action \n% 
52-4-9. Enforcement of chapter - Suit to compel 
compliance. 
(1) The attorney general and county attorneys of 
the state shall enforce this chapter 
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter 
may commence sun in a court of competent jurisd-
iction to compel compliance with or enjoin violat 
ions of this chapter or to determine its applicability 
to discussions or decisions of a public body The 
court may award reasonable attorney fees and court 
costs to a successful plaintiff \m 
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(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) 
through (i). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals abjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1968 
78-2-3. Repealed. ises 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law. isss 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1968 
78-2-6. Appel late court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation 
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court. 
1966 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1966 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services of any sheriff in the state. isss 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1966,1968 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal. 1966 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January, next follow-
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or.fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court 1968 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(0 appeals from district court in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs involving a criminal convic-
tion, except those involving a first degree or capi-
tal felony; 
78-2a-4 JUDICIAL CODE 262 
(h) appeals from district court involving do-
mestic relations cases, including but not limited 
to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and pater-
nity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court, may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1988 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. 1906 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 
any of its functions in any location within the state. 
1966 
CHAPTERS 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1. Repealed. 
78-3-1.5, 78-3-1.6. Repealed. 
78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals. 
78-3-5. Repealed 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative Sys-
tem — Primary and secondary county 
locations. 
78-3-12. Repealed 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Counties joining courtjsystem —j^roce^ 
dure — "Facilities"— Salaries. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and 
fines. 
78-3-15, 78-3-16. Repealed. 
78-3-16.5. Fees for filing and other services or ac-
tions. 
78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to coun-
ties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short ti-
tle. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20 Definitions. 
•78-3-2r Judicial council —-Creation — Members 
__— Terms and election — Responsibili-
ties — Reports. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Appoint-
ment — Qualification*! — Salarv. 
Section 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the 
courts — Appointment of trial court 
executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provide information and sta-
tistical data to administrator of the 
courts. 
78-3-27, Annual judicial conference. 
78*3-28. Repealed. 
78-3-29. Presiding judge — Election — Term — 
Compensation — Powers — Duties. 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. i$m, i98i, 19S8 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed ini-
tially until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appoint-
ment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the 
district courts is six years, and commences on the 
first Monday in January, next following the date of 
election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is 
appointed and qualified 1968 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution-and ^not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraor-
dinary writs and other writs necessary to carry into 
effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council and subject to policies 
established by the Judicial Council, cases filed in the 
district court, which are also within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be transferred to 
the circuit court by the presiding judge of the district 
court in multiple judge districts, or the district court 
judge in single judge districts. The transfer of these 
cases may be made upon the court's own motion or 
upon the motion of either party for adjudication. 
When an order is made transferring a case, the court 
shall transmit the pleadings and papers to the circuit 
court to which the case is transferred. The circuit 
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been 
originally commenced in the circuit court and any 
appeals from final judgments shall be to the Court of 
^Appeals. 
(4) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and 
decrees of the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 
and 78-2a-3. 
(5) The district court has jurisdiction to review 
agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Chap-
ter 46b, Title 63, and shall comply with the require-
ments of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudi-
cative proceedings. 1988 
78-3-5. Repealed. tsss 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
Each district court shall hold court at the county 
seat of each county within the district at least once in 
each quarter of the year. i98s 
rro_o * ^ j f i j l j ^ p n . 1 ^ 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative 
System — Primary and secondary lo-
cations. 
(U There is established a State District Court AH-
EXCERPT FROM: RICHFIELD CITY POLICY DEPARTMENT 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 
POLICIES AMD PROCEDURES Policy No. 10 
Date January 1 107q 
Subject Departmental Discipline 
Effective Date January 1» l^n 
This directive shall supersede all other departmental policies* 
dealing with departmental discipline. 
Persons Subject to Disciplinary Action 
A. Any officer who violates his trust by committing 
any off-ense punishable under the laws, ordinances, or 
statutes of the United States, the State of Utah, the City 
of Richfield; or who violates any provisions of the Rules 
and Regulations of the Richfield City Police Department; or 
who disobeys any lawful order; or who is incompetent to 
perform his duties; is subject to appropriate disciplinary 
action• 
B. The word "discipline11 is a derivative of the latin word 
"disciplina", meaninq instruction or education. The 
purpose of discipline is to facilitate coordination of 
effort. Positive discipline is an inner personal desire to 
observe and follow the regulations and procedures of an 
organization. Negative discipline is compliance through 
fear of punishment or penalty. Tt is the hope that all 
officers will exercise positive discipline. 
C. Penalties - Subject to the anproval of the Chief of Police, 
the following penalties may be imposed against any 
officer or employee of the Department as disciplinary 
a c t i o n : 
1) 
2) 
/ 
4) 
5) 
Verbal reo*-u* .tond. 
. . - on ror?r*iTTTdnd # Ylr4 
Suspension. 
Demotion. 
D i s m i s s a l . 
Departmental Authority to Discipline 
D. Final departmental disciplinary authority and responsibility 
rests with the Chief of Police. Except for verbal 
reprimands and emergency suspensions, all departmental 
discipline must be taken or approved by the Chief of 
Police. 
E. Other supervisory personnel may take the following 
disciplinary measures: 
1) Verbal reprimand. 
2) Written reprimand (subject to approval by the commanding 
officer). 
3) Emergency suspensions. 
4) VJritten recommendations for other penalties. 
F. Emergency Suspension - Any command or supervisory officer 
has the authority to impose emergency suspension until the 
next business day against an officer or employee v/hen Lt is 
apparant that such action is in the best interest of the 
Department. 
G. Follow-Up Action on Emergency Suspension - An officer or 
employee receiving an emergency suspension shall be 
required to report to the Chief of Police on the next business 
day at 1000 hours (10:00 a.m.) unless otherwise directed 
by competent authority. The command or supervisory officer 
imposing or recommending the suspension shall also report 
to the Chief of Police a t the same time. 
Comp 1 a i n t s Aga I n s t 1 >o .1 1 c e P er so nne 1 
H. All complaints arising externally (from ~utside the Police 
Department) shall be brought to the attention of fbe Chief 
immediately. 
Internal complaints shall be' brought to the attention of 
the Chief or other supervisory officer. • 
J. All complaints against Police Personnel shall be reduced 
to written form. 
K. A supervisory officer receiving an internal complaint shall 
conduct an immediate investigation into the allegation. If 
the allegation is substantiated he shall then take action to 
correct the infraction immediately. 
Reports of Disciplinary Action Taken or Recommended 
L. Whenever disciplinary action is taken or recommended, 
(except for oral reprimand) a written report must be 
submitted immediately containing the following information: 
1) The name, rank, and present assignment cf the person 
being disciplined. 
2) The date(s) and time(s) of the misconduct and the 
location(s)• 
3) The section number (s) of this manual violated and/ ,>r 
the common name for the infraction. 
4) A complete statement of the facts of the misconduct, 
5) The punishment imposed or recommended. 
6) The written signature and rank of the preparing 
officer and his position in relation to the 
member being disciplined. 
Distribution of Reports of Disciplinary Action -
The report shall be distributed as follows by the 
officer imposing or recommending disciplinary action: 
1) Original and copy to the Chief via the complete 
chain of cor-nand. 
2) Copy to the person being charged. 
3) COPV to the City Manaaer. 
4) Copy retained by officer imposing or recommending 
the action. 
Endorsement and Forwarding of Disciplinary Reports -
Each level in the chain of command must endorse and 
forv:ard reports bearing on disciplinary matters 
received. Sue* M^lorsements may be one of approval, 
disapproval or modification. No r.'fiiber or employee 
shall alter or uc.i se to be altered or withdraw any 
disciplinary reoort. Disciplinary reports in transit 
through the chain of command shall not be delayed, 
but must be reviewed, endorsed, and forwarded as soon 
as possible. Disciplinary reports shall be filed in 
accordance with current departmental directives. 
Informing the Person Being Disciplined - The member 
or employee being disciplined shall be informed of the 
charges and penalties at the time such action is taken. 
Citizen Complaints Against Police Personnel -
Complaints by citizens against members or employees 
of this Department >ha 1 1 he i i oeessed in 1 he following 
manner: 
1) During Normal Business Hours - Such complaints 
will be referred to the Chief unless it is of 
such minor or invalid nature that the officer 
first contacted can dispose of the incident 
satisfactorily* 
2) Other Times - Outside normal business hours, the 
officer receiving the complaint shall notify the 
senior officer on duty who will take one of the 
following actions: 
a) Instruct the receivinc officer to investigate 
the complaint. 
b) Receive and investigate the complaint himself. 
c) Notify the Chiet or commanding officer when he 
feels such action is necessary. 
Investigation.of Mlegec Misconduct Reportu Against 
Officers -
Any officer assianed the investigation of an alleged 
act of misconduct on the part of a member or employee 
of this Department shall conduct a thorough and accurate 
investigation. 
Such investigation shall include formal statements from 
all parties concerned, when necessary and pertinent, 
the gathering and preservation of any physical evidence 
pertaining to the case, and all other information 
bearing on the matter. 
Investigation Reports - The investigation of alleged 
acts of misconduct must be reduced to writing and 
include the following: 
1) A summary of the complaint or alleged act of 
misconduct. 
2) Pertinent portions of the statements of all 
parties to the incident. 
3) A description of the incident, physical evidence, 
and other evidence important to the case. 
4) The observation and conclusions of the investigating 
officer. 
Distribution of Investigative Reports -
The report shall be distributed as follows by the 
officer conductinq the investigation: 
1) Original to the Chief. 
2) Cony to the City Manager. 
Actions That Can Result in Disciplinary Action -
If an investigation determines that an officer or 
employee is guilty of any of the following offenses, 
he shall be either reprimanded, suspended, or dismissed; 
according to the nature and seriousness of the offense: 
1) Hillful violation of the rules, regulations, and 
policies of the Department. 
2) Shielding the actions or abetting a fellow officer 
in the violation of any law or departmental 
regulation or policy. 
3) Insubordination, and/or the disrespect to a 
superior officer. 
4) Failure to comply with the valid verbal orders of -a 
superior officer. 
5) Failing to assist a fellow officer when requested, 
in accomplishing an arrest or in serving a legal 
process. 
6) Conduct subversive to the aood order and discipline 
wit hin—t he—Depa r t me n t-. 
7) The use of disrespectful language toward or 
concerning any fellow officer or an employee* 
S) Making derogatory remarks about other officers or 
employees either to members of the Department or 
to any person outside the Department unless it is 
done as a formal statement to a superior officer or 
an official investigative board, 
9) The iibe ci unnecessary violence or discourtesy 
against a prisoner. 
10) Discourtesy toward any citizen. 
11) Incompetence or unwillingness to render satisfactory 
service, as shown by performance evaluations below 
satisfactory standards or as otherwise determined by 
supervisory officers. 
12) Absence without leave or failure to notify the 
proper authority concerning an absence. 
13) Falsely reporting reason for absence as being sick. 
14) Sleeping while on duty. 
15) Acts involving moral turpitude including immorality, 
indecency, lewdness, or dishonesty. 
16) Intoxication and/or the use of intoxicating drugs 
or beverages while on duty or at any time while 
in uniform. No officer or employee shall appear on 
duty in an unfit condition due to the consumption of 
alcohol! "Unfit condition" shall mean having 
any measurable amount of alcohol in the blood. 
17) Undue familiarity with persons of bad repute. 
18) Failure to pay just debts. 
19) Knowingly allowing another person to use an 
officer's badge and/or identification card. 
(fo) Disclosure of confidential information to un-
authorized persons. 
21) Continued or gross neglect; of personal appearance, 
of duty, or in the use of departmental materials 
and equipment. 
22) Negligent or willful damage to City property. 
23) Failure to respond to proper assignments. 
24) Failure to submit proper reports. 
25) Failure to appear in Court at the proper time and 
place after receiving notification of trial or 
hearing. 
26) Failure to maintain a clean an^ functioning firearm. 
This shall apply whether the weapon is personally 
owned or issued by the Department. 
27) The acceptance of any gratuity. 
23) Conduct unbecoming a professional police officer 
such as to bring one's self, the City, or the 
Department into disrepute. 
29) Other forms of misconduct as determined by the 
administrative officials of the Deportment and 
the City. 
T. Actions That Shall Result in Direct Dismissal -
If an investigation determines that an officer or 
is guilty of any of the following offenses, he shall 
he dismissed from the Department: 
1) Conviction of the violation of any ordinance, 
statute, or law, the violation of which is consid-
ered to be a serious offense. 
2) The acceptance of mon^y or anything of value, 
in consideration for refraining from taking proper 
legal action aqainst any person suspected of the 
commission of a crime. 
3) The material falsification of an application for 
employment. 
4) The use of bribery or political influence to secure 
employment in the Department or advantages while 
so employed. 
U. Rehabilitation -
Whenever possible, personnel will be warned and 
given an opportunity to innrove before dismissal is 
made. 
A member or officer may be claced on probation for a 
specified neriorl cf time if circumstances warrant it. 
During this time, ^e wi] 1 be closely supervised and 
evaluated with the hope of salvaqinq such individual. 
V. Exit Interviews -
*^*xirtr interviews nay be held with -the Chief of Police 
if desired by the dismissed person. 
W. Appeals -
A member of the Department may request a review of 
disciplinary action by submitting a written request 
to the Chief of Police. Additional appeal procedures 
may be followed as outlined in the Richfield City 
Personnel Policies and Procedures manual. 
Dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield City 
Appeals Board. Procedures for such appeals are outlined 
in the Richfield City Personnel Folicies and Procedures 
manual. 
